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Is There a Federal Definitions 
Power? 
Ernest A. Young† 
Abstract 
Although the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor on 
equal protection grounds, that case also raised important and 
recurring questions about federal power. In particular, defenders of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) argued that Congress may 
always define the terms used in federal statutes, even if its definition 
concerns a matter reserved to the States. As the DOMA illustrates, 
federal definitions concerning reserved matters that depart from state 
law may impose significant burdens on state governments and private 
citizens alike. This Article argues that there is no general, 
freestanding federal definitions power and that sometimes—as with 
marriage—federal law must incorporate state law definitions.  
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† Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay contributes to 
the Case Western University Law Review’s symposium on “The 
Supreme Court’s Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage in United States v. 
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry: Analysis and Implications” held on 
Oct. 25, 2013. My contribution grows out of a brief that I drafted in 
collaboration with Jonathan Adler, Lynn Baker, Randy Barnett, Dale 
Carpenter, and Ilya Somin, as well as Roy Englert, Erin Blondel, and 
Carina Cuellar at the firm of Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, 
Untereiner, and Sauber. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). I am immensely grateful to these 
fine scholars and lawyers for their extraordinary input and support on 
the brief, but I wish to spare them any blame for what I say here. 
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Introduction 
In United States v. Windsor,1 the Supreme Court held that 
Congress may not discriminate, in the administration of federal 
programs, between same-sex and different-sex couples that are each 
legally married under state law. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy said that such discrimination, required by Section 3 of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),2 violated the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.3 This essay, however, 
concerns a different argument that the Court had before it but did 
not reach in Windsor—that is, that Congress lacked any enumerated 
power to define marriage in such a way as to exclude same-sex couples 
from the federal definition of marriage.4 The Court was entirely 
sensible not to reach this argument, but the debate in and around 
Windsor gave rise to broad claims about Congress’s power to define 
the terms in federal statutes in ways that impose burdens on 
individuals and state governments.5  
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7). 
3. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Although the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, the Court has 
held that similar equality requirements bind the federal government 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
4. See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 8. 
5. See, e.g., Nick Rosenkranz, Congress Has Power to Define the Terms of 
Its Own Statutes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:31 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/06/congress-has-power-to-define-the-
terms-of-its-own-statutes/; Nick Rosenkranz, There Is No Federalism 
Objection to Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.volokh. 
com/2013/03/24/there-is-no-federalism-objection-to-section-three-of-the-
defense-of-marriage-act/; see also Ed Whelan, Badly Confused Amicus 
Brief on Federalism in DOMA Case, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 5, 
2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/342256/ 
badly-confused-amicus-brief-federalism-doma-case-ed-whelan (offering a 
more ad hominem version of the same argument). For some early 
responses, see Randy Barnett, DOMA and Federalism: What are the 
limits of Congress’s power to define terms in federal statutes? A Reply 
to Whelan and Rosenkranz, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 7, 2013, 
6:44 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/07/doma-and-federalism-
what-are-the-limits-of-congresss-power-to-define-terms-in-federal-
statutes-a-reply-to-whelan-and-rosenkranz/ (incorporating a post by 
your present author); Randy Barnett, The Chief Justice’s Excellent 
Hypothetical: Under Our System of Federalism, Can You Be Both 
Married and Unmarried at the Same Time? THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Mar. 28, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/28/the-
chief-justices-excellent-hypothetical-under-our-system-of-federalism-can-
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Is There a Federal Definitions Power? 
1271 
That issue is unlikely to go away. As DOMA illustrates, 
Congress’s ability to rule persons in or out of innumerable federal 
regulatory schemes and benefit programs gives it significant leverage 
over matters that it might well lack power to regulate directly. One 
can readily imagine other federal interventions into controversial 
aspects of family and privacy law masquerading as federal 
“definitions”—for example, federal definitions of “parent” or “child” 
that excluded same-sex adoptions, or a federal definition of “person” 
that included a fetus. If the arguments for Congress’s “definitional” 
prerogative are taken seriously, they would offer a formalistic end-run 
around the few remaining limits on Congress’s enumerated powers. 
I argue here that Congress lacks any freestanding “definitions 
power.” Most federal definitions, of course, will either fall within or be 
necessary and proper to the implementation of Congress’s specifically 
enumerated powers. But the Court’s recent decisions make clear that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is not a blank check; there will be 
instances in which Congress cannot impose its own definition of a 
particular concept and must, as a matter of constitutional necessity, 
adopt the definition provided by state law. Federal law, in these 
cases, takes state law as it finds it. I submit that the definition of 
marriage, at least in the broad context of DOMA, is one of those 
instances. 
The definitional issue, as I have said, transcends the immediate 
controversy over DOMA. In keeping with the theme of this 
Symposium, however, Part I offers a few thoughts about the broader 
relationship of federalism principles to that controversy and to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor. Part II turns to the 
constitutional basis and limits of Congress’s authority to define terms 
for purposes of federal law. Part III concludes with some implications 
of those limits. 
I. Federalism, Equality, and Windsor 
It has become fashionable both to criticize Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Windsor as unclear or incoherent and to discount its 
references to federalism.6 In this symposium, Andrew Koppelman’s 
 
you-be-both-married-and-unmarried-at-the-same-time/; Jonathan H. 
Adler, A Final Response to Ed on DOMA, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 1, 
2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/344376/final-response-ed-doma-jonathan-h-adler. 
6. See, e.g., Sandy Levinson, A brief comment on Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Windsor, Balkinization (Jun. 26, 2013, 11:50 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-
kennedys.html (writing off Windsor’s federalism arguments as “some 
blather about traditional state sovereignty and marriage”). Professor 
Marcus’s contribution to this symposium goes to great ornithological 
lengths to disprove that Windsor relied on federalism. See Nancy C. 
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otherwise interesting discussion dismisses federalism as a “distraction” 
and accuses Justice Kennedy of “oddly fetishiz[ing] state law.”7 I find 
Kennedy’s opinion neither incoherent nor unclear; in fact, it is surely 
one of the finest examples in the United States Reports of 
interweaving principles of federalism with principles of equal 
protection. Much of the reaction to the opinion may arise because it is 
not what most commentators either hoped or expected to see.  
It has likewise become commonplace to condemn those of us that 
presented federalism arguments to the Court in Windsor as somehow 
disingenuous or operating in bad faith. “Beware of conservatives 
bearing gifts,” Linda Greenhouse warned in a New York Times blog 
post.8 Striking down DOMA on federalism grounds, in her view, is “a 
truly bad idea, and the campaign for marriage equality would be 
worse off for it.”9 
Part of the problem with this argument is that it is bad 
constitutional law. Ms. Greenhouse, who is not a lawyer, asserts that 
“[a] ruling that left the states to their own devices when it comes to 
marriage would take the equal protection guarantee out of the 
picture.”10 That, of course, could not be more incorrect. If the Court 
had said, as the Federalism Scholars’ brief argued, that Congress 
lacked enumerated power to enact DOMA, that would have had 
absolutely nothing to do with whether a state-level ban violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. And I remain mystified why Greenhouse 
reads that brief as an “assertion of implicitly boundless state 
authority over family affairs.”11 Equating an argument that marriage 
lies within the States’ reserved power with a claim that that power is 
not subject to federal constitutional rights guarantees is simply an 
elementary mistake. 
 
Marcus, When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in 
Disguise: How Windsor’s State Powers Sets the Stage for the Demise of 
Federalism-Based Marriage Discrimination, 64 CASE WES. RES. U. L. 
REV. 1073, 1111–12 (2014). I have addressed that argument elsewhere. 
See Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and 
Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2012–2013 Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 117, 118–9 (2013); Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor and 
the Role of State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 39, 46 (2013). 
7. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare 
Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE WES. RES. U. L. REV. 1045, 1070 (2014). 
8. Linda Greenhouse, Trojan Horse, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/trojan-horse/?_php 
=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.  
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
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The Federalism Scholars’ brief did argue that, because the 
Constitution reserves power to define marriage to the States, Congress 
may not assert any interest in defining marriage in a way that reflects 
the moral views of the national community.12 It is true that a State 
would have such an interest, and in that sense a state same-sex 
marriage ban would present a somewhat tougher case. But the 
hornbook principle that states have a general police power interest in 
protecting the “health, safety, and morals” of the community is not 
something one can make go away simply by scrunching one’s eyes 
closed. It is this principle, for instance, that also undergirds state laws 
approving same-sex marriage. And in the end that principle is unlikely 
to make any difference in a challenge to a state’s same-sex marriage. 
The most plausible arguments against state same-sex marriage bans 
have always invoked levels of scrutiny that this sort of general police-
power interest in morality cannot satisfy,13 and the Court made clear 
in Lawrence v. Texas14 that a bare interest in upholding community 
morality was insufficient to sustain a law that harmed gay people. In 
any event, acknowledging what is plainly true—that states have some 
interest in making moral choices on behalf of their citizens—hardly 
“take[s] the equal protection guarantee out of the picture,” as Ms. 
Greenhouse asserts.15 Every assertion of a state’s interesting in 
defining family status relationships remains subject to Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge; Loving v. Virginia,16 which Greenhouse cites, 
makes that absolutely clear. The fact that DOMA had constitutional 
problems in addition to equal protection doesn’t change that fact. 
It is worth dwelling on Ms. Greenhouse’s error, moreover, because 
it displays a broader misunderstanding about the relationship between 
federalism, liberty, and equality. As someone who graduated from 
college in the sixties, it’s not surprising that Greenhouse equates 
federalism with racism.17 This is a parochial perspective in terms of 
 
12. See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 7–8. 
13. See, e.g., Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation 
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html 
(outlining the Administration’s view that DOMA is unconstitutional 
because sexual orientation is a suspect classification triggering strict 
equal protection scrutiny). 
14. 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (“Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare 
desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy 
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
15. Greenhouse, supra note 8.  
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
17. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67 (2001) (“In my formative years as a 
lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s, [federalism] 
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both time and space. It ignores not only the antebellum history, in 
which national power was consistently exerted to preserve slavery, 
often over the objection of northern state governments,18 but also the 
reality of contemporary American politics, in which state governments 
are often at the vanguard of progressive causes.19 It ignores the 
comparative constitutional experiences of other multi-level governance 
systems; the German Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, has 
recently reaffirmed that constitutional principles of democracy and 
fundamental human rights require limits on the centralization of 
power in the European Union.20 And it ignores much of the best 
contemporary scholarship on constitutional structure, which lauds 
federalism as a way of empowering dissenting minorities.21  
was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent 
racial oppression, political persecution, and police misconduct.”). 
18. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); HENRY ADAMS, 
AMERICAN STATESMEN: JOHN RANDOLPH 272–273 (John T. Morse Jr. 
ed.) (1882) (observing that, in the antebellum period, “[b]etween the 
slave power and states’ rights there was no necessary connection. The 
slave power, when in control, was a centralizing influence” and “states’ 
rights were the protection of the free [s]tates”).  
19. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue 
States’ Rights: Federalism after the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 799, 801 (2006) (“Gay weddings in San Francisco and 
Massachusetts, like popular initiatives authorizing physician-assisted 
suicide in Oregon and medicinal use of marijuana in California, 
exemplify recent progressive experimentation at the local level through 
policies that could not command a national majority. Under such 
political circumstances, liberals should hesitate before rejecting the 
Rehnquist Court’s new federalism.”); David J. Barron, Reclaiming 
Federalism, 52 DISSENT 64, 67 (2005) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism). Contemporary liberals are also rediscovering that the states 
have often taken the lead on progressive causes throughout our history.  
See, e.g., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG 
PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE 
RIGHTS (2013) (documenting how progressive proponents of education, 
labor, and environmental rights succeeded in enshrining those rights in 
state constitutions throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
20. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
2009, 123 BVerfG 267 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] 2011, 129 BVerfGE 124;  Russell Miller, 
Germany vs. Europe: The Principle of Democracy in German 
Constitutional Law and the Struggle for European Integration, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014) (noting the German high court’s conclusion 
that retention of democratic authority at the Member State level “has 
significance for fundamental, basic individual rights including personal 
freedom and human dignity”). 
21. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 
DEMOCRACY JOURNAL (Spring 2012, http://www.democracyjournal. 
org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=1; Heather K. Gerken, 
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
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Ms. Greenhouse appears uninterested in any of this. Instead, she 
asks “where have these people been for the past 17 years?”22—as if 
only proven liberals are morally entitled to challenge a law like 
DOMA.23 If Greenhouse had done any actual reporting on the subject, 
she would know better. Dale Carpenter, one of the prime movers of 
the brief, has advocated gay rights from a conservative perspective for 
over two decades.24 Randy Barnett, another co-author of the brief, has 
not only been the leading intellectual defender of Lawrence v. Texas25 
but has also made federalism arguments in favor of other liberal 
causes—most notably as counsel for Angel Raich in the Supreme 
Court’s medical marijuana case.26 My own record is similar.27 It is 
insulting for Greenhouse to cry “hypocrisy”—especially without 
checking the facts.  
It may be that the gratuitous nastiness of Ms. Greenhouse’s 
attack—“Federalism tends to emerge from under the rocks,”28 like a 
serpent or an insect—reflects the last gasp of a dying paradigm. In  
22. Greenhouse, supra note 8.  
23. For a far more sensible perspective by better lawyers, see Mary Bonauto 
& Paul Smith, Who’s Afraid of Federalism?, ACSblog (Apr. 17 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/who%E2%80%99s-afraid-of-federalism 
(discussing DOMA in the context of federalism). 
24. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, A Traditionalist Case for Gay Marriage, 50 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 93 (2008); Brief of Amici Curiae Republican Unity 
Coalition and the Honorable Alan K. Simpson in Support of 
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (co-
author); Dale Carpenter, A Conservative Defense of Romer v. Evans, 
76 IND. L. J. 403 (2001). 
25. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: 
Lawrence v. Texas, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 37 (2003); see 
also Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102)  (of 
counsel to brief making libertarian arguments against sodomy laws). 
26. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
(No. 03-1454). Professor Barnett’s oral argument in Raich can be 
accessed here: http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_ 
1454/ (visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
27. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-
1454) (making federalism arguments on behalf of medical marijuana 
users); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover 
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
1277, 1306-07 (2004) (criticizing DOMA a decade ago); Lynn A. Baker 
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 120–21, 154 (2001) (criticizing federal laws 
like DOMA as a pathology that federalism doctrine should aim to 
prevent and extolling state-law protection of gay rights). (Professor 
Baker also signed the Federalism Scholars’ brief in Windsor.)  
28. Greenhouse, supra note 8. 
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any event, the present symposium provides ample illustrations of the 
contributions federalism can make to the same-sex marriage debate. 
Consider some of the arguments advanced by same-sex marriage 
opponents in these pages. Maggie Gallagher and William Duncan, for 
instance, draw a sharp distinction “between a desire to harm and a 
desire to affirm.”29 This point loses much of its force when we consider 
what DOMA actually does, which is to strip couples like Edith 
Windsor and Thea Spyer, who were legally married under state law, 
of their legally married status for purposes of federal law. Gallagher’s 
point poses a classic baseline problem, but it is no longer a problem 
when we remember that our Constitution empowers states to 
determine what the baseline should be.  
Similarly, Robert George and Sherif Girgis contend that claims for 
marriage “equality” conflate two distinct strands of traditional 
thought about marriage.30 The “romantic” view, which stresses the 
emotional attachment and commitment of two persons, plausibly 
embraces same-sex couples, but the “procreative” view, which stresses 
reproduction and child-rearing, does not.31 If this is right, then it is 
not obvious how a court is to choose between these competing marital 
traditions, either in determining whether same-sex and different-sex 
couples are “similarly situated” for equal protection purposes, or in 
giving content to a fundamental right to marry for due process 
purposes. Again, however, federalism resolves that dilemma in 
DOMA’s case. The critical point is that the Great State of New York, 
through its democratic processes, has made a decision in favor of the 
romantic view by recognizing same-sex marriage. Whether or not the 
Constitution itself favors one view or the other—a considerably 
harder question—the national political branches have no 
constitutional authority to displace a state’s resolution of the 
question.32 
More fundamentally, I have argued elsewhere that federalism has 
been integral to the astounding change in American attitudes toward 
same-sex marriage in the last decade.33 Federalism has allowed 
proponents of same-sex marriage, who began as heavily outnumbered 
 
29. See Maggie Gallagher & William C. Duncan, The Kennedy Doctrine: 
Moral Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 949, 951 (2014). 
30. Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson & Robert P. George, What Is 
Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense 28–36 (2012) (discussing 
the romantic and procreative views of marriage). 
31  Id.  
32. See generally Young, Role of State Law, supra note 6, at 43–47.  
33. See Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: 
Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1133 (2014).  
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minorities at the national level, to “dissent by deciding” in those few 
jurisdictions in which they found themselves in the majority.34 It may 
well be that the Court will soon have to confront the constitutionality 
of state-law restrictions on same-sex marriage, and in that event it 
will have to move beyond federalism to confront difficult questions of 
equal protection and due process of law. But as I have already 
explained, the Court’s reliance on federalism in Windsor will not 
prejudice arguments in favor of same-sex marriage under the 
Constitution’s rights provisions. And the Constitution’s federal 
structure will have been critical in bringing our nation to the point 
where a constitutional right to same-sex marriage is plausible.  
II. Congress’s Power to Define Marriage 
I turn now to a different federalism argument that the Court did 
not reach in Windsor—that is, the claim that Congress lacked any 
enumerated power to enact DOMA. This argument is worth 
considering, despite the Court’s decision to go a different way, 
because the problem of federal definitions transcends the issue of 
same-sex marriage. I will focus on DOMA here because it affords such 
a good illustration of the issue, but I will also suggest other areas in 
which federal authorities might attempt to leverage a “definitional” 
power into substantive regulation that would otherwise fall outside 
Congress’s enumerated scope. 
Section 3 of DOMA amended the Dictionary Act—the portion of 
Title I of the U.S. Code that defines the meaning of terms that occur 
in acts of Congress and other federal legal materials. It provided: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.35 
In so providing, DOMA amended over 1100 federal statutes that 
include the word “marriage” or “spouse,” and it altered the 
administration of innumerable federal regulations and programs.36 
Prior to DOMA, federal law had—absent specific exceptions tied to 
 
34. See, e.g., Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 21, at 1764 
(arguing that federalism can empower minorities). 
35. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
36. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 20, 32–40 United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2858.    
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specific regulatory circumstances—simply taken couples to be married 
if they were married under state law.37 Those state laws varied 
significantly in a number of respects, such as the age of eligibility to 
marry and the permissible degree of consanguinity.38  
It is worth noting that DOMA did not actually create a federal 
definition of marriage. By DOMA’s terms, a “union between one man 
and one woman” is still only a marriage if it is “legal”—that is, if it 
meets whatever other requirements state law imposes.39 There are no 
general federal age requirements, consanguinity prohibitions, or rules 
concerning “common law” marriages. Federal officials do not issue 
marriage licenses; there are no federal marriages. And federal officials 
attempting to determine whether persons interacting with federal 
programs are married must look to state law regardless of DOMA. 
That statute created only a federal-law constraint on state-law 
definitions of marriage by prohibiting federal law from recognizing 
same-sex unions.  
If there is a federal definitions power, then, it is not at all clear 
that DOMA could be justified as an exercise of it. Such a power 
would have to be grounded in the notion that federal officials need a 
uniform federal definition of critical terms in order to implement 
federal law, but DOMA provides no such definition. If anything, the 
continued ability of federal law to operate without a federal 
definition—even during the years DOMA was in effect—shows that 
necessity cannot support any general definitional power. 
I want to put this objection to DOMA aside for now, because the 
issue of federal definitions has independent significance. The power to 
define terms might be justified in three distinct ways. First, such 
definitions might fall within Congress’s enumerated powers, such as 
the power to regulate interstate commerce. Second, definitional 
powers might be implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
incidental to the accomplishment of some enumerated end. Finally, 
some of DOMA’s defenders seem to have thought that power to 
define terms is somehow just inherent—that is, if Congress has power 
to enact a statutory scheme that employs certain terms, it necessarily 
has the power to define those terms.  
 
37. See id. at 37; see also Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Family Law 
Professors and  the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers in 
Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 9–11, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), available at https:// 
www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/windsor-v-united-states/amicus-brief-
of-family-law-professors.pdf (providing examples).   
38. See, e.g., id. at 8–9.    
39. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
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A. Specific Enumerated Powers  
The enumerated powers point need not detain us long. One can 
certainly imagine situations in which providing a definition fits 
comfortably within an enumerated power. As part of its power to 
create a uniform rule of naturalization, for example, Congress might 
define “citizen” to include persons naturalized according to certain 
criteria. Congress’s power to incorporate international law into 
domestic law explicitly includes the power to “define” as well as 
“punish” offenses against the law of nations. But it is hard to think of 
any enumerated power that would cover defining “marriage.”  
The “default” basis for federal regulation, of course, is the 
Commerce Clause. Although the Supreme Court continues to 
interpret the Commerce Clause quite broadly, the Court has 
nonetheless required that the regulated activity be commercial in 
nature.40 Weddings, of course, can involve a great deal of commercial 
activity. (I know because I just helped pay for mine.) But the 
marriage at the heart of the festivities is not itself commercial in 
nature. The commerce power alone thus cannot confer power to define 
“marriage” under DOMA. 
A more plausible candidate is the Spending Power, and in fact 
this would certainly support some applications of DOMA. If Congress 
created a federal tax credit for married couples, for instance, it would 
be entitled to determine which married couples should receive the 
benefit. And there are, in fact, a number of federal spending programs 
to which marital status is relevant.41 The Tax Power would likewise 
support some applications of DOMA. When Congress taxes, it has at 
least some power to define the persons on whom the taxes fall.  
Nonetheless, neither the Taxing nor the Spending Power can 
support the extremely broad sweep of DOMA, which indiscriminately 
governs all federal statutes and programs—over 1100 statutes in all—
many of which have nothing to do with the power of the purse. 
DOMA affects, for example, copyright protection, government ethics 
rules, and testimonial privileges.42 Moreover, DOMA would likely be  
40. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).  
41. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY 
IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/0
6-21-samesexmarriage.pdf (providing a breakdown of spending programs 
affected by same-sex marriage).  
42. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 31–2 (2012) (stating that spouses of senate 
members may not accept gifts); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 203(a)(2) (2012) 
(providing the definition of widow and widower as the surviving spouse 
for copyright law); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006) (stating that judges have a 
conflict of interest if their spouse has a financial interest in the outcome 
of a case); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1242–43 (6th Cir. 
1984) (discussing the federal privilege against testimony by a spouse). 
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unconstitutional in many of the situations where it affects the 
provision of federal benefits. DOMA requires States that have 
recognized same-sex marriage to refuse recognition to those marriages 
when administering federal benefit programs.43 Where federal funds 
are provided on a matching basis, DOMA will often require states to 
withhold their own money from couples who are entitled to benefits 
under state law. This spending condition applies retroactively to 
programs in which the states have participated for decades, and there 
is no clear statement of the condition in the relevant statutory 
grants.44 That is probably enough to render such a condition invalid 
under the Court’s Spending Clause precedents.45 And a condition that 
cuts across so many different federal programs, involving many 
different sources of funding, would surely be coercive.46 
Another possibility is Congress’s power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments. That might work if Congress sought to 
legalize same-sex marriage nationwide, but only if the Equal 
Protection Clause can be interpreted to require such a result.47 This is 
why same-sex marriage advocates should not reject federalism 
arguments against DOMA on the ground that it would prohibit 
Congress from vindicating same-sex marriage rights as a matter of 
national law. If they are right about the Equal Protection Clause, 
then a federal statute would remain possible.48 It seems extremely 
unlikely, however, that it is unconstitutional for a state to recognize 
same-sex marriage; hence, the Section Five power is asymmetrical in 
this context and cannot support DOMA’s flat ban on recognition for 
purposes of federal law.  
43. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 13–14.   
44. Id.   
45. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 
(2012) (holding that Congress may not “surpris[e] participating States 
with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions”); Arlington Cent. Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (conditions must 
be stated “unambiguously”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987) (discussing limitations on the Spending Power). 
46. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (holding that the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally 
coercive). 
47. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517–19 (1997) (holding 
that Congress may legislate under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only to prevent or remedy an actual constitutional 
violation). 
48. Such a statute might seem unnecessary if the federal Constitution in 
fact requires recognition of same-sex marriage. But the Section Five 
power confers on Congress broad remedial powers once a constitutional 
violation is identified, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1966), so there still might be advantages to federal legislation in this 
area.  
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The last relevant power is Congress’s authority, under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, to “prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”49 This provision gives Congress broad authority to enact 
federal choice of law rules, although it has generally chosen to leave 
choice of law to the states.50 It would support, for example, the 
proposed Respect for Marriage Act,51 which would have federal law 
recognize any marriage that is legal in the state of celebration. It 
would even suggest a more emphatic version of that law, which would 
require all states to recognize marriages that are legal in the state of 
celebration (or, for that matter, one that would forbid states to 
recognize marriages that are not legal in the state of celebration). 
Congress has broad power over choice of law. But DOMA is not a 
choice of law provision. If the Full Faith and Credit power gave 
Congress the ability to simply substitute a federal rule of its own 
choosing for any otherwise-applicable state rule of decision, that 
would amount to an unlimited legislative power.  
B. Necessary and Proper 
It is considerably more plausible to ground a broad power to 
define terms for purposes of federal law in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause’s provision for implied powers. Ever since McCulloch v. 
Maryland,52 the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has 
broad powers under what the founding generation justly called the 
“Sweeping Clause.”53 But the Court’s more recent decisions in United 
States v. Comstock54 and National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius55 have strongly suggested that Congress’s Necessary and 
Proper powers are not unlimited. In particular, the Court has imposed 
three distinct requirements when Congress undertakes to use 
unenumerated powers pursuant to that provision. The first is that 
such legislation be “incidental” to the exercise of an enumerated  
49. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
50. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial 
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. 
Rev. 249 (1992). 
51. Respect for Marriage Act, S. 1236, 113th Cong. (2013). Professor 
Koppelman is thus wrong to suggest that striking down DOMA on 
enumerated powers grounds would call this bill into question. See 
Koppelman, supra note 7, at 1061–71.  
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819). 
53. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 
43 DUKE L. J. 267, 270–71 n.10 (1993). 
54. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
55. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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power.56 The Sweeping Clause allows Congress to employ 
unenumerated means so long as they are necessary and proper to the 
accomplishment of an enumerated end.57 But it does not allow the 
pursuit of unenumerated ends or the use of unenumerated means for 
their own sake.58 As John Marshall warned in McCulloch, “should 
Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would 
become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act 
was not the law of the land.”59  
Obviously, it will often be hard to tell the difference between 
means that are legitimately incidental, on the one hand, and those 
that are pretextual. Was the designation of a class of federal sex 
offenders in Comstock, for example, simply incidental to the 
imprisonment of offenders against federal laws, which was in turn 
incidental to the regulation of Commerce and other federal 
enumerated powers?60 Comstock was a hard case, and the Court 
plainly struggled with it.61 But sometimes Congress is not particularly 
subtle. It seems safe to say that a law entitled “The Defense of 
Marriage Act” is there to regulate marriage for its own sake—not as 
an incidental means of making some other federal regulatory scheme 
more effective. And Mr. Clement’s brief defending DOMA was candid 
enough to argue in precisely those terms.62 
A more objective approach to this requirement emphasizes the 
nature of the power Congress employs. In National Federation of 
 
56. See id. at 2591 (stating that the Necessary and Proper Clause “vests 
Congress with authority to enact provisions ‘incidental to the 
[enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise’”) (Opinion 
of Roberts, CJ.) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)  at 418); see 
also GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, & 
GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE 76, 83 (2010). 
57. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 
44 DUKE L. J. 1, 13 (1994). 
58. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411 (stressing that creating 
a corporation is “never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of 
effecting something else”). 
59. Id. at 423. 
60. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1976 (asserting that actions by Congress 
were incidental and therefore within its authority). 
61. See generally Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
2009–2010, at 239 (2010). 
62. Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 42, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (Jan. 22, 2013) 
[hereinafter BLAG Brief]. 
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Independent Business, the Chief Justice recognized that the Sweeping 
Clause does not “license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and 
independent power[s]’ beyond those specifically enumerated.”63 Given 
the widespread agreement that marriage is one of the “bedrock 
institution[s]” in our society,64 the power to define that institution is 
plausibly a “great substantive and independent power” that one 
would expect the Constitution to have separately enumerated if the 
Framers had meant to confer that power on Congress.65 
The second requirement, likewise traceable to McCulloch, is that 
the unenumerated means must be “plainly adapted” to Congress’s 
enumerated end.66 This is a means/ends fit requirement, and the 
Court’s analysis is traditionally deferential.67 But although McCulloch 
is often credited as originating the rational basis standard, Justice 
Kennedy recently went out of his way to insist that the hyper-
deferential post-1937 version of rational basis review, employed in 
substantive due process and equal protection cases not involving 
fundamental rights or suspect classifications, does not apply to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.68 Rather, he said that “[t]he rational 
 
63. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (Opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411); accord 
id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ, dissenting). 
64. BLAG Brief, supra note 62, at 41–42; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (asserting that marriage is “one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”). 
65. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411.  
66. See id. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). 
67. But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (Opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (cautioning that “deference in matters of policy cannot, 
however, become abdication in matters of law”); see also LAWSON, 
MILLER, NATELSON, & SEIDMAN, supra note 56, at 118–19 (noting 
agreement in the early Republic that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
did not expand Congress’s power beyond what would have existed by 
implication from the enumerated powers in any event). 
68. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (“This 
Court has not held that the Lee Optical test, asking if ‘it might be 
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to 
correct’ an evil, is the proper test in this context. Rather, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, application of a ‘rational basis’ test 
should be at least as exacting as it has been in the Commerce Clause 
cases, if not more so.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)). 
We need not remind the gentle reader that Justice Kennedy might as 
well have a numeral “5” tattooed on his forehead for these purposes. 
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basis [required] . . . is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical 
demonstration.”69 
Any such demonstration would be difficult to make for DOMA. 
The Act’s definition of marriage excludes same-sex couples in the 
context of over 1100 different federal statutes. Often the exclusion is 
nonsensical: As the Court noted in Windsor,70 DOMA means that a 
bribe offered to the same-sex spouse of a federal official would be 
excluded from coverage under the federal ethics and corruption rules.71 
The more fundamental point, however, is that a provision that applies 
in shotgun fashion to over 1100 federal laws is “plainly adapted” to 
none. Congress was not trying to enhance the operation of the tax 
code or the immigration laws, for example, when it enacted DOMA. 
While those exercises of Congress’s enumerated powers do sometimes 
require the federal government to determine which state-sanctioned 
marriages it will recognize for specific federal purposes, DOMA was 
not enacted for any such purpose. 
Finally, the use of an unenumerated means must be not only 
“necessary” to achieving some enumerated end but also “proper.”72 In 
the founding era, this meant that laws “must be consistent with 
principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and 
individual rights.”73 But that formulation—if it is to be more than 
tautological—is hard to unpack. In National Federation of 
Independent Business, the Chief Justice suggested that the individual 
health insurance mandate was improper because it extended federal 
power in a way that had no obvious stopping point.74 With respect to  
69. Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (attributing this 
standard to “the Commerce Clause cases”). 
70. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
71. See id. at 2695 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (prohibiting federal 
officials from participating in matters where their spouses have a 
financial interest); 2 U.S.C. § 31–2(a)(1) (prohibiting spouses of 
Senators and Senate employees from accepting high-value gifts from 
certain sources)). 
72. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (stating 
that when a law violates state sovereignty, it is not “proper” under the 
Commerce Clause); see also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967–68  
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is of fundamental 
importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty 
are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause . . . .”); LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON, & SEIDMAN, 
supra note 56, at 78. 
73. Lawson & Granger, supra note 53, at 297. 
74. 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (joint dissent); 
see also Jonathan Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. 
Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 177–80 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. 
Metzger, & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013). 
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DOMA, the strongest argument is that Congress had appropriated a 
power that is reserved exclusively to the states.75 Moreover, 
Congress’s intrusion on that power interfered with the States’ own 
exercise of their powers over marriage.76 
This sort of argument is likely to raise hackles, because it seems 
to invoke long-discredited principles of “dual federalism.” Under the 
dual federalism doctrine, the national and state governments each 
enjoyed exclusive authority over particular realms of public life; the 
federal government could regulate foreign affairs and interstate 
commerce, for example, while the states reigned over family law, 
public education, and wholly intrastate commercial activity.77 The 
Court rejected dual federalism as part of its famous “switch in time” 
after 1937, and modern constitutional doctrine generally understands 
federal and state regulatory authority as concurrent in nature.78 But 
one can recognize that Congress’s powers frequently and necessarily 
overlap with state authority without insisting that Congress may 
exercise every single power that the states could exercise. Just last 
term, the Court held in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 
Inc.79 that while the Elections Clause authorizes Congress to regulate 
the time, places, and manner of federal elections, it does not permit 
Congress to set qualifications for voting.80 In other words, although 
Congress and the states exercise concurrent power over the field of 
voting, their powers are not coextensive. So, too, with family law. 
Although Congress’s powers over interstate commerce, immigration, 
and other matters can and do yield valid federal legislation touching 
 
75. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 22–23. 
76. See, e.g., Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether 
essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the 
assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, 
that is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the 
reach of federal power.”). 
77. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual 
Federalism, LV NOMOS 34–82 (2014); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The 
Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie Earle ed., 1968); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., 
Federalism 183 (2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands 
federal and state governments to operate in different spheres of 
authority.”). 
78. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1950); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. 
REV. 253, 254. 
79. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).  
80. Id. at 2257 (stating that “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to 
regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them”).  
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on marriage, the power to define marriage itself is plausibly reserved 
to the States.81 
C. Do Definitions Require an Enumerated Basis? 
The remaining possibility is that definitions are just different—
that they don’t need to be grounded in either an enumerated power or 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. The best way of putting this claim 
might run as follows: When Congress enacts a statute like ERISA, or 
the tax code, or the bribery statute it presumably has some 
enumerated basis for that statute; in my examples, that basis would 
be the commerce power, the taxing power, and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, respectively.82 All a federal definition does is clarify 
exactly what Congress is doing under each of these powers. Congress 
may tax married couples at a different rate than singles, and a federal 
definition of “marriage” simply clarifies upon whom the tax falls. No 
distinct “power” is needed to do this; the underlying power to enact 
the statutory scheme in the first place will suffice. 
This argument depends, however, on definitions being 
fundamentally different from regulatory provisions. There are at least 
three good reasons to doubt that this is true. First, federal definitions 
frequently have legislative effects.83 DOMA meant that, throughout 
the realm of federal law and federal programs, same-sex spouses would 
be treated as if they were unmarried. This affected eligibility for 
federal benefits and duties under federal regulatory statutes. Perhaps 
there are aspects of internal governmental operations that have no 
effects in the outside world. But most federal definitions change legal 
rights and obligations in ways that may profoundly impact private 
citizens. 
It is easy to think of other examples. Consider, for example, a 
federal definition of “divorce” that rejected contemporary notions of 
“no fault” divorce. Federal law would thus continue to treat couples 
as married, notwithstanding a valid divorce under state law, if they 
did not meet the federal requirements. To take just a few examples, 
 
81. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“The 
definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader authority 
to regulate the subject of domestic relations . . . .”). 
82. I take it that the bribery statute would be justified on the ground that, 
when Congress regulates pursuant to its enumerated powers, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause confers an incidental power to create 
federal executive officials to implement those regulations. A prohibition 
on bribery would then be incidental to making sure those officials 
actually did their jobs. 
83. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (stating that a government 
action is “essentially legislative” if it “had the purpose and effect of 
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the 
Legislative Branch”). 
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their federal tax obligations, eligibility for federal benefits, intellectual 
property rights, and survivorship rights under federal pension plans 
would all proceed on the assumption that the couple remained 
married. Imagine the complications if one or both of the individuals 
tried to re-marry—would federal law treat that second marriage as 
invalid?84 While a federal definitional change would not sweep as 
broadly as a federal statute attempting to preempt state rules on 
divorce, it would nonetheless have pervasive regulatory consequences.  
Or consider a federal definition of “property” that failed to 
recognize certain sorts of rights that would be valid under state law. 
A federal definition of property might refuse, for example, to impose 
the doctrine of “avulsion,” which holds that land created by a sudden 
event belongs to owner of the seabed (often the government). That 
definition would limit the rights that state property owners might 
otherwise have over new land adjacent to their property; for instance, 
owners would presumably have no right to just compensation under 
federal law if the state were to take the new land. Any such 
qualification of property rights by denying their recognition under 
federal law would surely diminish the economic value of the state-law 
rights. Again, the point is simply that formerly calling a federal law a 
definitional change hardly prevents it from having legislative effects. 
Second, federal definitions have effects that are not confined to 
the federal government; in many circumstances, they may impose 
obligations on state officials and significantly interfere with the 
operation of state law. DOMA required state officials to disregard 
state law when administering federal programs. State officials 
administering veterans’ cemeteries, for example, had to disregard 
state law and exclude veterans’ same-sex spouses.85 Second, DOMA 
interfered with the implementation and enforcement of state law itself 
and imposed substantial costs on the states. For instance, DOMA 
rendered state spousal-support orders arising out of divorces involving 
same-sex couples unenforceable in bankruptcy and precluded use of 
garnishment procedures ordinarily available for monies in federal 
 
84. One implication would be serious pressure on divorcing couples to allege 
fault regardless of state law (with all the negative consequences that 
drove most states to abandon that requirement) simply to insure that 
their divorce would be recognized under both federal and state law. 
85. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. 
Supp. 2d 234, 239–41 (D. Mass. 2010). The requirement that state 
officials disregard state definitions of marriage may be analyzed as a 
condition on their states’ participation in federal programs like 
Medicaid. From that perspective, it is unlikely that DOMA could 
validly apply to any programs that states elected to participate in prior 
to DOMA’s effective date. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–08 (2012) (striking down retroactive 
conditions on Medicaid participation).  
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hands.86 It prevented state income tax regimes from “piggybacking” 
on federal forms, rules, and enforcement.87 And it increased the taxes 
that states as employers pay when they extend health insurance to 
same-sex spouses.88 These effects reflect DOMA’s fundamental 
purpose, which was to discourage states from adopting a definition of 
marriage that departed from Congress’s preferences.89 
Congress’s powers to legislate and to interfere with the operations 
of state governments are limited by Article I. I submit that everything 
Congress does—or at least those actions that have effect outside of 
Congress itself—must be either grounded in a specific enumerated 
power or justified as an implied power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. Most federal definitions will easily clear one or the 
other of these hurdles. But where they do not, federal law must adopt 
the relevant state-law definitions. 
Finally, a note about Windsor itself: the fact that Congress lacks 
power to regulate the marriage relationship would be relevant to that 
case even if one believed in some kind of freestanding federal 
definitional power. Even if one concedes that Congress can define its 
terms, Congress’s enumerated powers limit the range of interests that 
Congress may assert in support of those definitions when they are 
challenged under the Constitution’s rights and equality provisions. 
Congress might define “marriage” so that its statutes are intelligible, 
but it cannot assert an interest in maintaining the traditional 
institution of marriage in response to an equal protection challenge. 
That is because maintaining that institution is not itself within any of 
Congress’s enumerated powers. What Congress cannot do, in other 
words, is exactly what the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group did in 
the Windsor litigation: assert that it has the same interest as a state 
in defining who can and cannot be married.90 And without such an 
interest, the discrimination inherent in the DOMA is awfully hard  
to defend. 
 
86. See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note †, at 33–34. 
87. See Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-
Recognition Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex 
Relationships, 24 Colum. J. Gender & L. 29, 33–41, 48–71 (2012). 
88. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 243–44. 
89. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (DOMA’s 
purpose “is to discourage enactment of state same-sex marriage laws 
. . . . The congressional goal was ‘to put a thumb on the scales and 
influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws.’”) 
(quoting Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12–13). 
90. BLAG Brief, supra note 62, at 30–33. 
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III. Definitions and Constitutional Structure 
DOMA is gone and it seems unlikely that anyone will attempt to 
revive it at the federal level. Nonetheless, arguments about Congress’s 
power to define terms in federal law remain important for a number 
of reasons. The first is the potential to leverage “definitional” power 
into substantive regulation in other areas. The second has to do with 
the line between legislative and executive action, including in the 
same-sex marriage context. Finally, and most important, the absence 
of a general, freestanding definitions power underscores the 
fundamentally interstitial nature of federal law.  
The risk that defining terms may unduly broaden federal power 
arises, of course, only in those relatively uncommon areas where 
Congress otherwise lacks power to act. The domestic relations context 
in which Windsor arose thus remains the most likely candidate for 
other federal definitional statutes. The point is not that family law is 
an exclusive state enclave. I am generally skeptical that such enclaves 
exist,91 and in any event it is easy to think of examples—interstate 
child abductions, for instance—in which Congress’s traditional powers 
over interstate commerce and movement will come into play. But 
commercial activity is peripheral in this sphere, and enumerated 
federal power may often be unavailable. Moreover, the area of 
domestic relations and sexual privacy encompasses many of the most 
divisive social issues of our time; as DOMA itself illustrates, the 
temptation to wade into these waters will often be difficult for federal 
politicians to resist. 
Definitions are particularly important in the family law area, 
because so much of that law turns on status. Typically, state law 
defines the basic relationships—spouse, parent, child. These 
definitions carry immense moral significance, and they trigger far-
reaching legal consequences. Complex questions have arisen 
concerning these relationships: Who is the “parent” of a child created 
by artificial insemination and carried to term by a surrogate mother? 
At what point does a developing fetus become a “child”? The power 
to define these terms is, in a very real sense, the power to regulate the 
underlying relationships. And that is true even if the definition’s 
scope purports to be limited to federal statutes and regulations. The 
danger of broad federal regulation masquerading as mere definitions 
did not die with DOMA. 
A second implication of my argument has to do with separation of 
powers, not federalism. Congress lacks a general definition power 
because definitions sometimes amount to lawmaking, and any exercise 
of lawmaking must be measured by the enumerated powers. This 
suggests that the Executive branch lacks any general definitional 
 
91. See, e.g., Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 77, at 59–60. 
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authority as well. One way to test the intuition that “defining” is 
different from “lawmaking” is to ask whether DOMA could have been 
promulgated by the Executive branch acting alone. After all, we 
frequently assume that administrative agencies have power to flesh 
out the terms of federal statutes by defining relevant terms. If 
President Clinton had simply issued an executive order in 1996 
stating that federal agencies would not treat same-sex couples as 
married, it seems likely that that approach would have raised a few 
eyebrows. DOMA plainly made a policy choice on an important 
matter—it was the sort of decision that belonged to Congress. But 
that is because, while DOMA was framed as a definition, its 
proponents and opponents all understood it to be a significant 
legislative act. 
This has implications for the aftermath of Windsor. The Obama 
administration has announced that it has decided to treat all same-sex 
marriages as legal. To some extent, of course, the Executive branch 
must make difficult choice of law judgments unless and until Congress 
acts to resolve those issues under Article IV. It would seem fine, for 
example, to adopt a general rule that federal law will rely on the law 
of the place of celebration. But a general policy of recognizing all 
same-sex marriages is not a choice of law rule, but a substantive one. 
If DOMA amounted to legislation, that more beneficent policy would 
as well. And it could only be justified if it were (a) within Congress’s 
enumerated power and (b) within the scope of a valid delegation from 
Congress to the Executive.  
Finally, there is nothing surprising or disruptive about requiring 
federal law to incorporate state-law definitions on particular subjects. 
As Henry Hart argued long ago, federal law is generally “interstitial” 
in nature; Congress legislates against the background of state law in 
much the same way that a state legislature legislates against the 
backdrop of the common law.92 This is a fundamental principle of 
federalism in the post-New Deal era, and it is integral to the way we 
think about the relationship between state federal law in areas such as 
the Erie doctrine93 or federal preemption of state law.94  
 
92. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
Colum. L. Rev. 489, 492 (1954). 
93. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding 
that federal courts generally must apply state law in the absence of a 
federal statute or constitutional provision); Ernest A. Young, A General 
Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J. L., Econ. & Pol’y 17, 
68–76 (2014). 
94. See generally Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–36 
(1947) (adopting a presumption against preemption of state law); 
Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 78, at 265 (discussing the relationship 
between the presumption against preemption and the general view that 
federal law is interstitial). 
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The interstitial nature of federal law means federal legislation 
frequently takes state law as it finds it.95 Marriage, after all, is the 
quintessential example. As I have already discussed, DOMA simply 
ruled out for federal purposes one particular aspect of some states’ 
laws; it offered no federal definition of that term, and instead simply 
incorporated state law on every other aspect of what it means to be a 
“lawful” marriage. So too with innumerable federal statutes. The sky 
will not fall if Congress is denied, in areas outside its enumerated 
powers, the power to alter this traditional relationship between state 
and federal law. 
Conclusion 
The continuing importance of policing the limits of Congress’s 
enumerated powers, even at the margins, is evident from an argument 
that does not appear to have been made either in the legislative 
process that led to the DOMA or in subsequent debates about same-
sex marriage. That is, I have not heard anyone arguing that Congress 
could simply ban same-sex marriages across the board by preempting 
state laws recognizing such unions. Progressives should pause for a 
moment and think about that fact. We likely can attribute this 
constitutional dog that didn’t bark to cases like United States v. 
Lopez,96 which reaffirmed after a very long hiatus that yes, Virginia, 
there are constitutional limits on Congress’s legislative authority. 
Liberals derided that holding as a Sign of the Apocalypse,97 but it 
may have played a key role in one of the most successful progressive 
social movements of our time. It is yet another example of the key 
role federalism plays in protecting both liberty and equality. 
With that role in mind, this brief essay has sought to dispose of a 
particular argument for expanding Congress’s authority into places 
that it would otherwise lack power to enter. Congress cannot regulate 
same-sex marriage—or adoption, abortion, or immigration—simply by 
“defining” key terms in federal statutes to exclude persons engaging in 
disfavored activity. Everything Congress does must either rest on an 
enumerated power or be justified as an implied means that is 
“necessary and proper” to an enumerated end. These powers—both 
enumerated and implied—are capacious, and most federal definitions 
will have no problem passing over this bar. But at the end of the day 
federal law remains interstitial in its nature; there is no federal 
authority to fill in all the gaps in the name of completeness. In many 
instances, federal law must continue to take state law as it finds it. 
 
95. See Young, Role of State Law, supra note 6, at 39. 
96. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
97. See, e.g., Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the Future Constitutional Crisis, 
38 Ariz. L. Rev. 825, 825–26 (1996). 
